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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to investigate whether firm and industry level of 
competitiveness has had a moderating effect on the level of segment 
disclosure, prior to the introduction of IFRS 8 – operating segments 
for companies, with differing ownership structures in Malaysia. A self-
constructed segment disclosure index using data was drawn from firms 
listed in the Malaysian stock exchange for the period of 2006 to 2008. 
A total of 1,752 firm-year observations were used. The results show that 
competitiveness, either at the firm level or industry level experienced no 
effect on the extent of segment disclosures during the duration of pre-IFRS 
8. However, the findings suggest that accounting qualifications of audit
committee members, sizes of firms, years of listing, profitability and analyst 
following of the firms have significantly explain the extent to which segment 
information was disclosed in Malaysia.
Keywords: Segment disclosure, ownership concentration, emerging market, 
competitiveness
INTRODUCTION
The growth in internationalization of trade has resulted in firms’ diversion 
in products they offer and geographical locations that they represent. In the 
wake of this inevitable reality, the need for reliable information on each 
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of segments that firms operate in has become imperative for stakeholders 
and analysts. 
The introduction of International Financial Reporting Standard 8 
(IFRS8) on operating segments is an effort to bridge the information gap that 
persisted between users and preparers of accounts, especially in situations 
where consolidated financial statements are partially revealed in order to 
infer operational inefficiencies that present in some segments.  
One of motivations for the introduction of IFRS8 is to mandate the 
provision of segment’s information from the management perspective, which 
the presupposed will eliminate each information asymmetry that existed 
under the predecessor standard. Arguments were made that the predecessor 
standard availed undue managerial discretion, where the reported segments 
were substantially different to those that the internal decision makers 
utilized. This matter was argued due to both, competitive pressures faced 
by firms and ownership structures.    
Emerging economies are generally characterized by concentrated 
ownership with family ownership taking the lead (Claessens, Djankov, Fan 
& Lang, 2002). This is therefore reasonable to presume that the provision 
of information could be impaired by the entrenchment effects in these 
economies. This claim is exacerbated if one considers the proprietary costs 
as attached to such revelations. There is ample evidence in the literature 
to suggest that firms shy away to disclose information that could impair 
their competitive advantage. Firms with sensitive information and specific 
reference to segment disclosures would refrain them from disclosing such 
information, if the proprietary costs attached to those information outweighs 
that pressures exercised by the users of such information (Harris, 1998; 
Botosan & Stanford, 2005; Hayes & Lundholm, 1996). Hence, this is 
reasonable to conjecture that competitiveness plays a moderating role in 
the determination of extent to which a company would reveal its sensitive 
information. 
Given the plausibility of the above argument, this research attempts 
to investigate whether there was a moderating effect of competitiveness 
on the provision of segment information by Malaysian companies before 
the formal introduction of IFRS 8. Malaysia, with an emerging economy, 
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has fully adopted the provisions contained in IFRS 8 with effect, starting 
from January 2012. If the competitive pressures are likely to moderate the 
information provision in the post implementation period, they should have 
been highly pronounced in the pre implementation period, as discretions 
permitted under the pre-IFRS 8 regime were greater. Malaysia was chosen 
as the setting for the above analysis, due to the well fit of the country with 
the argument set out above. Most publicly listed companies in Malaysia 
originated as family controlled companies, with founding family members 
eagerly exercising the majority control. Although over the passage of time 
their ownership structures have become somewhat diffused, the founding 
family’s control still persists. Malaysia also presents itself with companies 
that have an ownership concentration stemming from institutional control, 
especially through shareholdings by the government. A number of 
companies which listed in the Malaysian stock exchange are controlled 
by the government, and hence the researchers of this study surmise that 
their informational disclosures could have been moderated significantly 
by competitiveness.
The results of this study suggest that neither increases nor decreases 
in the levels of segment disclosures under various ownership structures 
were moderated by competitiveness of firms at both firm and industry levels 
in Malaysia. There are three ownership structures that examined herein, 
namely family and founding family, managerial, foreign and institutional. 
This study contributes to the existing literature on segment disclosures 
in two ways. Primarily, this study considers the moderating effect of 
competitiveness on ownership structures as opposed to their direct effects 
as compared to what was done previously. Secondly, in measuring the extent 
of disclosures by Malaysian firms, this study, in addition intend to check 
for the financial and non-financial information mandated by the standard, 
performs content analysis on other disclosures such as the chairman’s 
statements, management discussion documents and operational results to 
corroborate the facts. The detailed  investigation of  disclosures on activities 
segmentation from various sources within the annual report has ensures a 
robust effort to seek evidence on whether the firms choose to remain opaque 
and reluctant to disclose their high quality of segment disclosures as a result 
of the ownership structure.
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT
The impact of ownership structure on levels of disclosure has been a topic 
of interest for many researchers (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Morck, Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1988; Morck & Yeung, 2003; Jiang & Habib, 2009). This has 
been widely acknowledged that developed countries tend to have diffused 
ownership structures, wherein no single shareholder owns a controlling 
percentage. Diffused structures are considered superior to concentrated 
structures as they curtail the incidences of expropriation of minority 
interests, and as a consequence provide disclosures with greater degree of 
detail that helps to reduce information asymmetry. Concentrated ownership 
structures on the other hand, when viewed through the lens of corporate 
governance literature, rank poorly due to their potential to expropriate 
minority interests. 
Companies in developing countries are typically characterized as 
having highly concentrated ownership structures. However, concentrated 
ownership leads to poor levels of disclosure, and remains inconclusive (Chau 
& Gray, 2002; Eng & Mark, 2003; Haniffa &, Cooke, 2002; Ho & Wong, 
2001). Concentrated ownership in companies occurs when a single category 
of shareholders own a majority of the shares, while the others are dispersed 
with no more than 5%. These categories of ownership could stand among 
of the founding family, management, foreign institutions, and the state.   
Some studies that relied on Agency Theory and information asymmetry 
hypotheses suggest that firms with concentrated ownerships have less 
incentive to disclose, either over and above the requirement. The rationale 
being that is due to the entrenched nature of the owners in the management 
of their businesses, as there would be low agency conflict and consequently 
low information asymmetry. Under such conditions, the literature argues 
that managers will imply with less disclosure, and taking advantage of the 
discretionary limits which accorded to them in the accounting standard.
Family and Founding Family Ownership
In the case of the East Asian countries, the controlling–shareholders’ 
holding more than 50% is common, and the separation of ownership and 
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control is least pronounced amongst family-controlled firms (Thillainathan, 
1999). Even in the developed sectors of the region, like Singapore and Hong 
Kong, the family ownership structures have been found as a determinant 
onto disclosure orientation of firms. (Lam, Mok, Cheung & Yam, 1994; 
Mok, Lam & Cheung, 1992). As all emerging markets are in the race to 
become developed markets, the propensity for them to hide their sensitive 
information could possibly create high competitive disadvantages. This was 
found to be so through the case in Hong Kong, where impaired performance 
by concentrated firms was further degraded the voluntary segment disclosure 
levels (Leung & Horowitz, 2004). 
Although the above arguments and empirical findings conform to 
rational expectations, an evidence is also presented as a contrary. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), and Morck and 
Yeung (2003) found that family controlled companies are less likely to 
engage with opportunistic behavior in reporting accounting earnings, if the 
engagement is potentially could damage the family’s reputation, wealth, 
and long-term performance. These researchers argue that family controlled 
type of firms would be inclined to report high quality financial information.
Given the contrary views, the extent to which managers have exercised 
the discretionary latitude provided under the pre-IFRS 8 when faced with 
family control and competitive pressures, remains as an empirical question, 
especially in the case of Malaysia. Following the popular expectation of 
negative impact on segment’s disclosures, the researcher of this study 
hypothesize that family-firms as tend to have greater incentive not to disclose 
the segment’s information, especially in the presence of firm and industry 
level competitiveness that protect their competitive advantages during the 
slot of pre-IFRS 8.
H1A:	 The	 extent	 of	 family	 and	 founding	 family	 ownership	will	
negatively	 impact	 the	 extent	 of	 segment	 disclosure	 for	firms	
with	higher	firm-level	competitiveness.
H1B:	 The	 extent	 of	 family	 and	 founding	 family	 ownership	will	
negatively	 impact	 the	 extent	 of	 segment	 disclosure	 for	firms	
with	higher	industry-level	competitiveness.
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Managerial Ownership
Managerial ownership arises when the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) or the executive directors acquire certain percentage of ownership 
in firms that they manage. In emerging countries such as Malaysia, the 
managerial ownership predominantly occurs when a manager or director 
is a founder of the firm or a member of the founding family (Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan & Lang, 2002). Due to this, managerial ownerships mirror 
the family ownership characteristics as per described earlier. Since the 
extent of managers’ shareholding has determines the extent of alignment of 
interests between the management and shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Demsetz, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), it is suggested that the 
traditional agency problem could possibly mitigate by enhancing managerial 
ownerships in firms, which thereby increasing managers’ incentive in 
providing more disclosure. Eng & Mak (2003) and Chau & Gray (2010) 
had confirmed this notion and shown the lower managerial ownership as 
to have a negative effect on disclosure. 
Managerial ownership, which is common and prevalent in emerging 
markets, tends to stifle public accountability when outsiders’ interests are 
relatively small. This is therefore argued through the controlling owners who 
have less incentive to provide detailed financial information. This can be 
further exacerbated by given the discretionary nature of segment disclosures 
and the disincentive for managers in closely-held firms to disclose segment 
information when having to face other stronger competition.  The researchers 
of this study therefore proposed the following hypotheses. 
H2A:	 The	extent	of managerial	ownership	will	negatively	impact	the	
extent	of	 segment	disclosure	 for	firms	with	higher	firm	 level	
competitiveness.	
H2B:	 The	extent	of managerial	ownership	will	negatively	impact	the	
extent	of	segment	disclosure	for	firms	with	higher	industry	level	
competitiveness.	
Institutional Ownership
Block shareholdings by institutions in companies represent their long 
term commitment. These institutional owners possess greater influence over 
individual’s owners due to the size of their investment and their ability to 
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harness expert knowledge. Therefore, this is reasonable to presume that 
higher institutional control in firms would trigger greater monitoring and 
consequently lead to the high quality of disclosures. Zhang and Ding (2006) 
argued that the strong shareholder activism by institutional investors would 
increases the quality of disclosures, which also helps in a way to improve 
investor’s ability in monitoring managers, as corroborates with similar 
conclusions stated by Jensen and Meckling (1976); Huafang and Jiangguo 
(2007); Chau and Gray (2002), and Haniffa and Cooke (2002).  Argument 
to the contrary has suggests that institutional ownership with the cause of its 
size and influence is potentially could be enjoying the access to privileged 
information, and minimising the need for formal disclosure.  
In the case of Malaysia, although the presence of active large beyond 
share ownership is minimal, there is a significant presence of state ownership 
in corporations. The political pressures, that exerted by the state and state 
affiliated institutions seem as highly happening in Malaysian companies, 
which resulting in such reluctance of firms to disclose thier information, 
as per evidenced by Ghazali and Weetman (2006). The researcher of this 
study hence believe that in the case of Malaysia, the companies which 
dominated by institutional ownership would be less willing to disclose 
segment information during competition.
H3A:	 The	extent	of	institutional	ownership	will	negatively	impact	the	
extent	of	 segment	disclosure	 for	firms	with	higher	firm-level	
competitiveness.	
H3B:	 The	extent	of	institutional	ownership	will	negatively	impact	the	
extent	of	segment	disclosure	for	firms	with	higher	industry-level	
competitiveness.
Foreign Ownership 
Foreign investors are likely to be less informed of the local economic 
realities and may demand more disclosures of financial information 
(Bradbury, 1991). Demands for disclosures are generally higher when 
foreigners hold high proportions of shares, which allowing them to reduce 
the need for more costly private information. However, Ananchoticul 
(2007), and Mangena and Tauringana (2007) found that foreign investors 
tend to become part of the ‘insiders’, when they have control over the firm, 
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and react like other local investors. This argument resulted to portray the 
weakness of corporate governance, and consequently mirroring to the low 
levels of disclosure. 
Unlike firms in other emerging market countries, Malaysian firms 
generally have low levels of foreign ownership. Hence, foreign investors are 
likely to react more alike with the minority shareholders, preferring firms 
to provide greater disclosures; both in quantity and quality. Due to their 
relatively insignificant presence in Malaysia, the extent to which managers in 
companies would yield to their demands has remains to be tested empirically. 
This is therefore reasonable to expect that managers in such firms will 
utilize the discretionary latitude which provided in the standard to conceal 
information, while considering in hampering competitive advantages. 
Hence, the researchers expect that the effect of foreign ownership on the 
extent of segment disclosure as to be negative for firms with higher firm 
and industry level competitiveness. 
H4A:	 The	 extent	 of	 foreign	 ownership	will	 negatively	 impact	 the	
extent	of	 segment	disclosure	 for	firms	with	higher	firm	 level	
competitiveness.	
H4B:	 The	 extent	 of	 foreign	 ownership	will	 negatively	 impact	 the	
extent	of	segment	disclosure	for	firms	with	higher	industry	level	
competitiveness.
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Sample
The sample for this analysis was chosen from Malaysian firms listed 
on Bursa Malaysia, with the data was collected from annual reports, which 
available in the Securities Commission Listing website and the Compustat 
database. The research data covers financial periods from 2006 to 2008. 
The data beyond the year 2008 was not considered as Malaysia introduced 
the significant changes to its corporate governance regulations partly in an 
effort to converge the accounting standards with the International Financial 
Reporting Standards in 2007. A further care was taken in order to include 
companies that contained significant percentages of foreign operations 
233
Ownership and segment disclOsure
(Nichlos & Street, 2007; Tsakumis Doupnik & Seese, 2006; Boonlert 
U-Thai, Meek & Nabar, 2006) which would help in a way to investigate 
hypothesis 4. 
The final sample contains 584 companies, covering all industry sectors 
with the exception of Banking, Finance, Trust and Insurance, and divisions 
that failed to perform a consistent report segment’s information during the 
evaluation period. Both ownership and segment data were handily collected, 
corroborating the information with matters stated in the Chairman’s 
statement, and notes to the financial statement contained in annual reports.
Segment Disclosure Index 
The quality of segment disclosure is an abstract phenomenon which 
cannot be measured directly as stated by Cooke and Wallace (1990). To 
circumvent this issue, prior studies have constructed disclosure indices in 
which to proxy the quality of segment information (Talha, Sallahuddin & 
Mohammad, 2006).  
In this study, a robust disclosure index was self–constructed, based on 
the mandatory disclosure checklist that specified in the IAS 14 (R), and the 
voluntary–disclosure checklist developed by Wang, Sewon and Clairborne 
in 2008. Conformation was also sought from relevant literature on the 
disclosure requirements for Malaysian firms listed in the Bursa Malaysia. 
The segment disclosure index was further validated by the content analysis 
method, using the chairman’s report and management discussion documents, 
which are available in the annual reports. Although there is no prior studies 
have used content analysis in measuring the quality of segment disclosure, 
this method is commonly done for other accounting disclosures such as 
corporate social responsibility or CSR (Amran & Devi, 2008; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2002). Herrmann and Thomas (1997) argued that, although the 
quality of segment disclosure is often measured by the number of disclosed 
items, it is not robust enough unless assisted with the corroborated of other 
statement disclosures. This research has overcomes the respective problem 
by incorporating content analysis in corroborating disclosures.   
In the application of scoring system, this research has determined 
a score of 1 as to be accorded for disclosure of an element, and 0 for 
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non-disclosure. The non–financial information was coded by using the 
topic–based analysis method used by Robb, Single and Zarzeski in 2001, 
as per recommended in the Jenkins report. The Jenkins report highlights 
four main items as desirable segment information, namely business, 
geographical disclosure, competitor analysis, and market share analysis as 
per highlighted by Chau and Gray (2002) and further extended by Wang, 
Sewon and Clairborne (2008). For each item of non–financial information, 
an additional score of 1 for disclosure or 0 otherwise was awarded.
The final scoring system contained a total of 31 items (4 non–financial 
information items and 27 item highlighted in IAS 14(R)). These scores were 
aggregated to form an overall disclosure scores. 
Model Specification 
The researchers of this study used regression analysis to test the 
moderating effect of competitiveness on the relationship between the types 
of ownership structures and the extent of segment disclosures.  
Model A: Firm-level Competitiveness Model
SDINXjt = β0 + β1 MANOWN*COCOMjt + β2 FAFOWN*COCOMjt 
+ β3FOREOWN*COCOMjt + β4 INSTOWN*COCOMjt + β5ACINDjt 
+ β6ACPROjt + β7SZFIRMjt + β8AUQjt + β9LISTYRSjt + β10LEVERjt + 
β11PROFITjt + β12ANALYSTjt + β13 INDUSTRYjt+ “ε”jt
Model B: Industry-level Competitiveness Model 
SDINXjt = β0 + β1 MANOWN*INDCOMjt + β2 FAFOWN*INDCOMjt 
+ β3FOREOWN*INDCOMjt + β4 INSTOWN*INDCOMjt + β5ACINDjt 
+ β6ACPROjt + β7SZFIRMjt + β8AUQjt + β9LISTYRSjt + β10LEVERjt + 
β11PROFITjt + β12ANALYSTjt + β13 INDUSTRYjt+ “ε”jt
Where:
Dependent	variable:
SDINXjt Segment disclosure index for company j, in year t 
Independent variables:
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MANOWNjt Managerial ownership for company j in year t  ;measured 
as percentage of shares held by executive directors  
FAFOWNjt Family and founding family ownership for company j in 
year t ; measured as percentage of shares held by family 
members and founding family members.
FOREOWNjt Foreign ownership for company j in year t ; measured as 
percentage of shares held by foreign companies.
INSTOWNjt Institutional ownership for company j in year t ; measured 
as percentage of shares held by institutions including the 
State.
Moderator	variables:
COCOMjt Company level of competitiveness for company j in year 
t ; measured as market share by taking ratio of company’s 
sales to the total sales of the companies in the same industry 
sector.
INDCOMjt Industry level of competitiveness for company j in year t ; 
measured as concentration ratio by taking the ratio of total 
sales made by two largest companies in the industry to the 
total sales of that industry
Control	variables:
ACINDjt Independence of audit committee for company j in year t  is 
measured by the ratio of non – executive directors in audit 
committee to total numbers of audit committee members.
ACPROjt Professional accounting qualifications possessed by the 
audit committee members for company j in year t ; measured 
by the ratio of number of audit committee members 
possessing accounting qualifications to the total number 
of audit committee members.
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SZFIRMjt Size of the firm for company j in year t ; measured by the 
natural log of total assets at the end of the fiscal year.
AUQjt Audit quality for company j in year t   is coded 1 if “Big 4” 
and 0 if “Non–Big 4”
LISTYRSjt Years listed in the stock exchange for company j in year t; 
measuredby total number of years since listing. 
LEVjt Leverage for company j in year t  is measured by long-term 
debt divided by shareholder equity.
PROFITjt Profit for company j in year t ; measured by net profits 
divided by total assets. 
ANALYSTjt Analyst following for company j in year t ; coded 1 if the 
firms have analysts’ following and 0 if none. 
INDUSTRYjt Industry dummy for company j in year t  for following 
industries: consumer discretionary; consumer staples; 
industrial; financial; information technology; healthcare; 
materials and utilities 
𝛽0 Intercept
𝛽1-13 Estimated coefficient for each item;
ε jt Error term
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive Results 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of this study. Based on the 
researchers, the average segment disclosure score is 0.34, which is very 
low. This indicates that managers in Malaysia have been taking advantage 
of the discretion that provided in the standard in order to inform less to the 
market. The ownership scores for managerial, family and founding family 
and foreign ownership are at 7.93 and 5.87 and 3.19 respectively. The higher 
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score of 8.4 for institutional ownership is a result of inclusion of the state 
ownership under this category. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
SDINX 0.000 0.647 0.339 0.137
MANOWN 0.000 57.270 7.931 12.366
FAFOWN 0.000 83.140 5.873 14.842
FOREOWN 0.000 61.970 3.188 10.188
INSTOWN 0.000 69.160 8.406 10.904
ACIND 0.574 1.000 0.934 0.089
ACPRO 0.000 1.000 0.575 0.213
SZFIRM 0.000 5.010 2.547 0.711
AUQ 0.000 1.000 0.567 0.496
LISTYRS 0.000 47.000 12.195 9.655
LEVER 0.000 28.180 3.813 3.476
PROFIT 0.000 20.050 2.345 1.399
ANALYST 0.000 1.000 0.411 0.492
INDCOM 0.000 0.330 0.022 0.053
COCOM 0.000 0.910 0.333 0.247
CDIS 0.000 1.000 0.173 0.379
CSTA 0.000 1.000 0.120 0.325
FIN 0.000 1.000 0.070 0.256
HTC 0.000 1.000 0.024 0.153
IND 0.000 1.000 0.334 0.472
MAT 0.000 1.000 0.057 0.231
UTL 0.000 1.000 0.173 0.379
Tables 2 and 3 present the Pearson correlation matrices for firm-level 
competitiveness and industry-level competitiveness. The segment disclosure 
scores (SDINX) are positively correlated with managerial ownership (firm 
level: p = 0.14; industry level: p= 0.14), and family and founding family 
ownership (firm-level: p= 0.09; industry level: p= 0.10) supporting the 
notion that managerial ownership in Malaysia is an evolution of family 
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ownership. The segment disclosure scores are also significantly correlated 
with the control variables, which are the size of the firm, years of listing, 
leverage, profitability, and the analyst-following. 
Table 2: Pearson’s Correlations for Firm-Level Competitiveness Model
SD
IN
X
M
A
N
*C
O
M
FA
F*
C
O
M
FO
R
E*
C
O
M
IN
ST
*C
O
M
A
C
IN
D
A
C
PR
O
SZ
FR
M
A
U
Q
LS
TY
R
S
SDINX 1**
MAN*COM .14** 1**
FAF*COM .09* -.09* 1**
FORE*COM .051 -.07 -.11** 1**
INST*COM -.03 -.06 -.01 -.03 1**
ACIND .05 .09* .07 .03 .09* 1**
ACPRO .04 .029 -.14** -.161** .06 .08 1**
SZFRM .25** .40** .05 -.07 -.06 .08 -.03 1**
AUQ 0 .11* -.11** .03 .03 .05 .03 .27 1**
LSTYRS .10* .19** .02 -.05 -.02 .07 -.08 .28** .04 1**
LEVER .09* .25** -.04 -.02 -.02 .05 -.06 .39** .13** .05
PROFIT -.17** -.05 -.02 -.01 .07 .05 .09* .11** -.04 -.06
ANALYST -.08* .13** .03 -.01* -.04 .17** .21** .22** .13** .04
CDIS -.01 .02 .21** .10* -.07 .04 -.14** -.12** -.06 -.08*
CSTA -.14** .012 .17** -.11** -.09* -.06 .06 .06 -.03 .11**
FIN -.06 -.05 .16** .19** .16** .06 -.04 .11* .02 .27
HTC -.01 .03 -.05 .06 .19** .11** -.01 -.05 .00 .00
IND .06 -.05 -.07 -.01 .08 -.06 .01 -.01 -.01 -.10*
MAT .05 -.06 .28** .02 .09* .13** -.02 -.17** -.06 -.03
UTL .01 -.07 -.21** -.14** -.12** -.09* .06 .03 .11** -.06
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LE
VE
R
PR
O
FI
T
A
N
A
LY
ST
C
D
IS
C
ST
A
FI
N
H
TC
IN
D
M
AT
U
TL
LEVER 1**
PROFIT -.14** 1**
ANALYST -.05 .08* 1**
CDIS -.07 -.02 -.11 1**
CSTA -.05 .04** .01 -.17** 1**
FIN -.02 -.07 .14 -.13** -.10** 1**
HTC -.02 .06 .05 -.07 -.06 -.04** 1**
IND .05 -.02 -.07 -.32 -.26 -.2 -.11 1**
MAT -.11** .14 -.04 -.11** -.09 -.07* -.04** -.17 1**
UTL -.05 -.04 .01 -.21** -.17** -.13** -.07* -.32 -.11 1**
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
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Table 3: Pearson’s Correlations for Industry-Level Competitiveness Model
SD
IN
X
M
A
N
*C
O
M
FA
F*
C
O
M
FO
R
E*
C
O
M
IN
ST
*C
O
M
A
C
IN
D
A
C
PR
O
SZ
FR
M
A
U
Q
LS
TY
R
S
SDINX 1
MAN*COM .14** 1
FAF*COM .1* -.0 4 1
FORE*COM .08 -.03 -.01 1
INST*COM .00 .02 -.03 .71** 1
ACIND .05 .02 .04 .09 .06 1
ACPRO .04 .02 -.03 -.02 .01 .08 1
SZFRM .25** .28** .01* .06 .02 .08 -.03 1
AUQ .00 .01 .06 -.00 -.02 .05 .03 .27** 1
LSTYRS .10* .11* -.02 -.03 .02 .07 -.08 .28** .04 1
LEVER .09* .24** .01 .00 -.00 .05 -.06 .39** .13** .05
PROFIT -.17** -.01 .01 .06 .07 .05 .09 .11** -.04 -.06
ANALYST -.08 -.00 -.12** .10* .13** .17** .21** .22** .13** .04
CDIS -.00 -.07 -.04 -.04 -.03 .04 .14** -.12** -.06 -.08*
CSTA -.14** -.06 -.02 -.04 -.04 -.06 .06 .06 -.03 .11**
FIN -.06 -.04 -.03 -.04 -.01 .06 -.04 .11* .02 .27**
HTC -.01 -.02 .06 .36** .40** .11** -.00 -.05 .00 .00
IND .06 -.11** -.10* -.06 -.09* -.06 .01 -.01 -.01 -.10*
MAT .05 -.04 .30** -.04 -.02 .13** -.02 -.17** -.05 -.03
UTL .01 -.07 .02 .04 .00 -.09 .06 .03 .11** -.06
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LE
VE
R
PR
O
FI
T
A
N
A
LY
ST
C
D
IS
C
ST
A
FI
N
H
TC
IN
D
M
AT
U
TL
LEVER 1
PROFIT .14** 1
ANALYST -.05 .08 1
CDIS -.07 -.02 -.11 1
CSTA -.05 .04 .10** -.17 1
FIN -.02 -.07 .14 -.13 -.10 1
HTC -.02 .06 .05 -.07 -.06 .04** 1
IND .05 -.02 -.07 -.32** -.26* -.19 .11* 1
MAT -.11** .14 -.04 -.11 -.09** -.07 -.04 -.17** 1
UTL -.05 -.04 .01 -.21 -.17 -.13 -.07 .32* -.11 1
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Table 4 shows the result of the regression. In Model A, the researchers 
examined the moderating effects of firm-level competitiveness on the 
relationship between types of ownership structures and the extent of 
segment disclosure. Besides, the researchers find positive and significant 
coefficients for managerial ownership (MANOWN*COCOM) (β = 0.234), 
and a positive and significant coefficient for family and founding family 
ownership (FAFOWN*COCOM) (β = 0.228). In Model B, the researchers 
examined the moderating effects of industry-level competitiveness where 
they found family and founding family ownership (FAFOWN*INDCOM) 
(β = 2.628) as positively associated with disclosure levels.   
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Table 4: OLS Estimations for Emerging Market
FIRM LEVEL (MODEL A) INDUSTRY LEVEL  (MODEL B)
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
(Constant) 5.770
(2.248)
19.056
(2.709)
MANOWN * COCOM 0.234 (1.871)*
FAFOWN * COCOM 0.228 (2.456)**
FOREOWN * COCOM -0.112 (-0.627)
INSTOWN*COCOM -0.036 (-0.282)
MANOWN * INDCOM 1.006 (0.913)
FAFOWN * INDCOM 2.628 (2.625)**
FOREOWN * INDCOM -3.219 (-1.347)
INSTOWN*INDCOM 0.308 (0.340)
ACIND 4.833 (0.784) 3.727 (0.603)
ACPRO 7.940 (2.984)** 6.708 (2.570)**
SZFIRM 5.563 (5.887)*** 5.384 (5.540)***
AUQ -1.736 (-1.539) -1.865 (-1.670)*
LISTAT -0.118 (1.964)* 0.113 (1.865)*
LEV -0.231 (-1.300) -0.242 (-1.360)
PROFIT -1.564 (-4.036)*** -1.619 (-4.168)***
ANALYST -3.357 (-2.810)** -3.347 (-2.770)**
CDIS -0.510 (0.133) 0.064 (0.017)
CSTA -5.560 (-1.400) -6.530 (-1.670)*
FIN -7.230 (-1.717)* -5.692 (-1.357)
HTC 1.081 (0.217) -1.767 (-0.346)
INT 3.888 (0.907) 4.505 (1.040)
IND 0.722 (0.197) 0.358 (0.098)
MAT 0.473 (0.122) -0.805 (-0.213)
UTL 6.348 (1.264) 4.584 (0.878)
R 2 0.176 0.173
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FIRM LEVEL (MODEL A) INDUSTRY LEVEL  (MODEL B)
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Adjusted R2 0.147 0.144
p- value 0.000 0.000
F – stat 6.019 5.892
Note: Significance at: *10; **5; 1*** percent level
Overall, these findings suggest that even in the presence of firm and 
industry-level competitiveness, companies that are family controlled were 
appear to be inclined in providing segment information. Although these 
findings run contrary to the expectation, a plausible explanation could 
be provided upon this matter. As per discussed in the literature review, 
family controlled companies have been found as to own a responsibility in 
protecting their reputation and long-term financial performance by providing 
more information than needed (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Morck, Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1988; Morck & Yeung, 2003). Therefore, these companies are not 
intimidated by the presence of competition, while highly prefer to have more 
concerned on the negative effects of not providing adequate information. 
The influence of managerial ownership on the other hand has appears 
to be significant when faced with firm-level competition. However, there 
is no influence of managerial ownership when faced with industry-level 
competition. The possible explanation for the pattern of influences would 
be gained through to the relationship of managerial ownership increment 
and the reduction of need in concealing information due to better alignment 
of objectives between owners and the managers. 
In summary, this research finds that the level competitiveness of 
firm and industry has no moderating effect in the provision of segment 
information for both family and management controlled companies. 
Although the positions of foreign and institutional ownerships have 
correspond to the expected signs in model A, the results are not statistically 
significant, which hence conclusive into the failure of making a judgement. 
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CONCLUSION 
Generally, the diversity of firm structures in the emerging markets has 
significantly influence the extent to which disclosures are made. Hence, the 
objective of this study is to examine the moderating effects of firm-level and 
industry-level competitiveness on segment information disclosures under 
different types of ownership structures amongst Malaysian companies.
The expectation in the presence of competition, irrespective of the 
nature of ownership, and the tendency for a company would withhold the 
information, in order to signify the competitive advantage protection. To 
substantiate this claim, the researchers invoked the agency and proprietary 
cost theories to argue that companies would use the latitude of discretion 
provided in the standard to inform less than more. 
 
However, the overall findings of this research suggest otherwise. 
Competitiveness, either at firm-level or at the industry level appears to 
have no moderating effect on the extent of segment disclosure. Although 
the findings were run contrary with the findings figured by Wan Hussein 
(2009), the interpretation should be implemented in the light of low values of 
segment disclosure, which were prevalent in Malaysia during the pre IFRS 
8 period. Through the low levels of disclosure (mean of 0.34), Malaysian 
companies is plausible to have already discounted onto the competitive 
pressures in their disclosure policies. All in all, the finding of positive 
associations of competitiveness in this research is not surprising. 
On the analysis of control variables, the researcher managed to figure 
out that the audit committee members with accounting qualifications tend 
to have a positive and significant impact on the extent to which segment 
disclosures are made. The role played by audit committees with competent 
knowledge appears to give a great influence towards the extent of segment 
disclosures by companies in Malaysia. However, the researcher failed to find 
any significant relationship between the independence of audit committee 
and the extent of segment disclosures, even though the presence of a highly 
independent audit committee is considered as a mandatory requirement of 
the corporate governance code. The findings also highlight that size of the 
firm, numbers years of listing, leverage, profitability, and analyst following 
as to have a significant effect on the extent of segment disclosure. 
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This study has contributes to the literature, by extending the findings 
of previous studies which mainly focused on the uniqueness of the family 
controlled firms in Malaysia, specifically on the extent of voluntary 
disclosures. In this study, the researchers have considered thorough 
perspectives, including the family controlled firms and ownership structures 
which dominated by management, institutions, and foreign shareholders. 
Additionally, the researchers attempted to investigate the popular belief 
of firms as likely to shy away from disclosing information whenever 
competition is around, as a reflection of protecting their competitive 
advantage. This confounding attribute has hitherto not yet been investigated 
in the Malaysian context, and the results of this study do suggest that this 
belief is does not been uphold in case which happening in Malaysia.  
Regulators and policy makers may find comfort in the findings of this 
research, as the objective of the revised standard is to elicit greater disclosure 
than what has been disclosed in the slot of pre-IFRS 8. Regulators also can 
use the results of this research in order to compare the moderating effects of 
competitiveness after the introduction of IFRS 8 by replicating this research 
for the post implementation period.  
LIMITATIONS
The conclusions of this study suffer from the following limitations. Firstly, 
although this study explains the moderating effects of competitiveness in a 
cross-section of industries in Malaysia, the omitted companies may contain 
information that could materially alter the conclusions. Secondly, this study 
assumed all disclosure items as to have the same weight. As the matter 
of fact, there is a possibility for a firm to achieve a high score by merely 
providing quantity at the expense of quality. Although, the content analysis 
employed in this research has circumvented this flaw, the possibility of 
bias still exists. Lastly, as this study is only limited to Malaysian data, the 
difficulty to generalise the findings with other countries or environments 
is inevitably unavoidable.
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